Vertical Integration, Exclusivity and Game Sales Performance in the U.S. Video Game Industry by Gil, Ricard & Warzynski, Frédéric
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Vertical Integration, Exclusivity and
Game Sales Performance in the U.S.
Video Game Industry
Ricard Gil and Fre´de´ric Warzynski
Aarhus School of Business, Aarhus University
December 2009
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/21049/
MPRA Paper No. 21049, posted 3. March 2010 18:29 UTC
Vertical Integration, Exclusivity and Game Sales Performance in
the U.S. Video Game Industry
Ricard Gil and Frederic Warzynski∗
December 2009
Abstract
This paper empirically investigates the relation between vertical integration and video game
performance in the U.S. video game industry. For this purpose, we use a widely used data set
from NPD on video game montly sales from October 2000 to October 2007. We complement
these data with handly collected information on video game developers for all games in the
sample and the timing of all mergers and acquisitions during that period. By doing this, we
are able to separate vertically integrated games from those that are just exclusive to a platform
First, we show that vertically integrated games produce higher revenues, sell more units and
sell at higher prices than independent games. Second, we explore the causal eﬀect of vertical
integration and find that, for the average integrated game, most of the diﬀerence in performance
comes from better release period and marketing strategies that soften competition. By default,
vertical integration does not seem to have an eﬀect on the quality of video game production.
We also find that exclusivity is associated with lower demand.
∗Ricard Gil is an Assistant Professor at the Economics Department of the University of California Santa Cruz, and
Frederic Warzynski is an Associate Professor at the Aarhus School of Business in Denmark. Corresponding author’s
email: rgil@ucsc.edu.
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1 Introduction
The study of the determinants of the boundaries of the firm is an important area of research in
Economics. This started oﬀ with Coase (1937) and extended through the works of Transaction
Cost Economics theories (e.g. Williamson, 1975,1985 and Klein, Crawford and Alchian, 1978),
Property Rights theories (e.g. Grossman and Hart, 1986 and Hart, 1995), and incentive-based
theories (Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991, 1994). These wide variety of theories have left many
untested predictions and a scarce empirical literature exploring the prevalence and impact of vertical
integration in a determinate set of industries. In their recent paper, Lafontaine and Slade (2009)
provide an extensive summary of this literature and strongly emphasize the need for more empirical
studies on the causes and consequences of vertical integration. We follow here their recommendation
and extend the existing literature by studying the impact of vertical integration in the U.S. video
game industry.
This industry has been studied before by others but in the past the analysis has focused on
either pricing and marketing strategies (see Nair, 2007 or Chiou, 2009) and the role of network
eﬀects (see Prieger and Hu, 2006 and Corts and Lederman, 2009). In this paper we focus our
analysis on the impact of vertical integration on video game performance. Existing studies have
mainly focused on vertical integration between publishers and platforms while proxying vertical
integration with software exclusivity. Due to the existing high correlation between exclusivity and
vertical integration, this approximation may not be bad if the goal of the study study is to quantify
the impact of network eﬀects on hardware demand. Nevertheless, this approximation may be
misleading if the final goal is to understand the role of vertical integration in video game production
and eventually video game demand. Our paper solves this problem by collecting information that
separates vertically integrated games from platform-exclusive games and provides new evidence on
the impact of vertical integration in the U.S. video game industry.
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The data that we use is from NPD on monthly video game sales in the U.S. between October
2000 and October 2007. This data set (widely used by others studying network eﬀects in this
industry), aside from information on sales, contains information on game publisher and platform
and video game genre, as well as revenues. We obtain average monthly price by dividing revenues
by sales in the US. This data set contains information for all video games for all platforms in both
6th and 7th generation. In addition to this, we complement the information in this data set in two
ways. First, we collected information from several industry webpages that detail the identity of the
developer of each game (unavailable in the NPD data set). Second, we collected information from
several publications regarding all mergers and acquisitions in the US video game industry between
October 2000 and October 2007.
Previous papers on the video games industry (Clements and Ohashi, 2005; Lee, 2008; Derdenger,
2009; Corts and Lederman, 2007) focused on the importance of network eﬀects (either direct or
indirect) on platform demand and platform competition. We analyze a diﬀerent issue. We want to
pin down diﬀerences in video game performance due to vertical integration of platform, publishing
and developing companies. One may imagine various reasons why vertical integration should matter
for video game performance. Vertically integrated games might be released in “better” periods
(Ohashi, 2005); vertical integration may solve contractual frictions in video game production that
allow these games to do better; another possible explanation is that publishing companies advertise
these games more or they market them better. In summary, there are a number of reasons why
there could be diﬀerences in performance between VI games and non-VI games. Our plan here is
to establish stylized facts that confirm these diﬀerences in performance and then disentangle the
importance of the diﬀerent explanations behind the correlation. In trying to accomplish this goal,
we control for as many demand factors as possible that may be unrelated to the channels through
which VI may aﬀect performance. We do this with a reduced form approach and using a large
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variety of fixed eﬀects that control for common demand shocks that drive demand at the platform-
month-year level, and therefore controlling for the importance of network eﬀects and generation
eﬀects (Corts and Lederman, 2007).
We separate our results into two well-diﬀerentiated parts. First, we establish cross-sectional
diﬀerences in performance between integrated and non-integrated games. We show that developer-
publisher integrated games, publisher-platform integrated games and developer-publisher-integrated
games collect higher revenues, sell more units and sell at higher prices than non-integrated games.
Second, we estimate video game demand controlling for price sensitivity and show that demand for
integrated video games is higher. Next we explore the source of this diﬀerence in demand. Our
results indicate that vertically integrated games are not idiosyncratically better or higher quality.
Instead, the diﬀerence in performance appears to come mainly from better release period strategies
that soften competition and better post-release marketing strategies.
This result is surprising because integrated development of video games is pervasive. According
to our data, more than 47% of video games are developed by an integrated developer and vertical
acquisitions of developers are quite common in this industry. Then our result posts the question
of what drives vertical integration in the movie industry. As previous literature has suggested,
network eﬀects are important in the video game industry and this would be a justification of
why publisher and platforms integrate video game development (even if it is at a cost in video
game quality) since platform demand increases. Another potential explanation is that internal
production of games is cheaper (than outsourced production) in that there are lower transaction
costs and adaptation costs of video game development. Publishers then economize on the trade-oﬀ
between cost and quality. It must be the case that for a large percentage of their games lower
costs of production compensate for lower quality.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the vertical chain
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in the video games industry. We describe our data set and its sources in section 3. Section
4 presents our empirical methodology and preliminary findings. We explore the causal eﬀect of
vertical integration in section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2 Institutional Detail: Vertical Chains in Video Games
We focus our analysis on the video games for consoles, so we first describe the console market.1
There are three big players in this industry: Sony and its PlayStation, Microsoft and its XBOX,
and Nintendo with its Game Cube — WII. We have recently entered the era of the 7th generation
of consoles (XBOX360, PS3, WII). Our plan is to study the impact of vertical integration on video
game performance during the 6th generation (PS2, GameCube and XBOX) and the overlapping
period between the 6th and the 7th generations. To simplify the phrasing, we will call the three
main actors on the console market the “console companies.”
Once the console is acquired by the consumer, games are needed to complement the hardware.
The vertical chain of the production of a video game starts with the development. Developers cre-
ate the content. They can either work for a publisher or be independent (third-party developer).
The publisher possesses the rights of the game and is responsible for the marketing and the man-
ufacturing process. An independent developer contracts with a publisher and receives royalties.
All developers also pay a licensing fee to the console companies. The console companies all have
their own publishing company but there are also many independent publishers, like Electronic Arts
(EA). The strategic advantage for console firms to vertically integrate at this stage is that they
can preclude the development of the game for other platforms, i.e. creating games unique for one
console. This brings additional value for the customers. As we will see in the data section, this
was the case of Sony for the 6th generation, and Microsoft for the 7th generation.
1See Williams (2002) for a detailed description of the video games industry.
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The manufacturing process per se obligatorily takes place at the manufacturer’s plant, owned
by the console companies. The publishers pay a fixed fee by copy of the game to the manufacturer.
The console companies earn most of their money from these licensing fees, plus their own video
games publishing and developing activities, while they break even or even lose money on the console
market.2
The video games market is considered to be a hit market, i.e. a market where sales are very
concentrated on only a few extremely successful products. For example, in December of 2007,
half a billion dollars was spent on video games for the XBOX360. Out of this, more than 150
million was spent on only two games. Another feature of this market is seasonality since sales
are concentrated during a very specific period. This is at the end of the year, in November and
December, during the Christmas period: more than 50% of 2007 sales for the WII and the PS3,
and more than 40% for the XBOX360 took place during that period. These are all characteristics
that we have in mind when analyzing our data below.
3 Data Description
We acquired from NPD group (a leading marketing information provider) monthly information on
unit sales and revenues for all video games belonging to the 6th and 7th generation in the US
between October 2000 and October 2007. We then linked these data to information on video
game developer identity from several websites and industry trade publications.3 Table 1 shows
summary statistics of monthly sales, monthly revenues and monthly average prices (mainly the
2The final two stages are distribution and retail. Since we do not study these two stages, we only describe them
briefly. Distributors store and deliver the product to the retailers (some publishers are integrated at this stage as
well). The retail market in the U.S. is dominated by the super stores like Wal-Mart or Toys’R Us. This stage has
remained relatively independent so far.
3Some of these are GameStats, GameSpot, Gamasutra and for very few particularly challenging video games
wikipedia.
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result of dividing revenues by sales) and vertical integration variables that we will be using in our
empirical analysis below. See that on average a game sold at $23, sold almost 6,000 units a month
and collected $220,000 a month. Our data also shows that a game stays on its run an average of
25 months. See as well that 44% of observations are from games developed and published by the
same firm (but not platform integrated), almost 5% of observations are from games published by a
publisher owned by a platform (but not developed by the platform) and that 3% of the observations
are from games developed and published by the same platform.
We can break up these vertical integration (and exclusive of each other) variables and find out
that 53% of observations are due to games developed by integrated developer and that 88% of the
observations are due to games published by an integrated publisher (and yet not necessarily be an
integrated game). Finally, see that when we define integration at the game level in a non-exclusive
way, developer-publisher integration increases to 47%, publisher-platform integration raises up to
8% and that by definition three-way integration (developer-publisher-platform) remains at 3%.
When breaking our data set by integration status (exclusively defined), see in the next three
columns that all three types of integration show larger averages of sales, revenues and prices (except
publisher-platform integration regarding prices) than the overall sample despite the fact that the
games seem all to last the same in the market, around 25 months.
In Table 2A we break up the sample by platform. We show that, within the consoles in the 6th
generation, PS2 released over 1,500 games within this period, XBOX 800 and GameCube a bit over
500. For consoles in the 7th generation and up to October 2007, XBOX360 had released almost
200 games for 130 of WII and 80 of PS3. In this table, we report average and median monthly
revenues by console. This allows us to see that the distribution of revenues are rather skewed and,
for example, in the 6th generation, PS2 was the clear winner of all three consoles since PS2 had the
most skewed distributions of the three consoles. Up to October 2007, it is diﬃcult to say which of
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the three consoles in the 7th generation is and would be the winner since all three sets of statistics
are quite similar, with a slight advantage to XBOX360.
More importantly, Table 2A also describes how vertical integration patterns vary by console.
Vertical integration seems to be uniformly more common among consoles in the 7th generation
than those in the 6th generation. This observation could be driven by the fact that the 7th
generation is just starting and consoles rely more on vertical integration at the beginning than at
the end of the generation run. Within the sixth generation, GameCube has the highest three-way
integration average with a 4.3% of its observations, followed by PS2 and XBOX with 3.5% and 2.3%
respectively. All three consoles have similar percentages around 40% and 45% of developer-publisher
vertical integration. The early data for the 7th generation seems to tell a diﬀerent story since PS3
is the console with the highest three-way integrated observations around 10%. WII follows with
6.4% and XBOX360 has 5.6%. The range of developer-publisher game integration (non-including
three-way integration) is also quite diﬀerent from the one observed in the 6th generation. Here,
the lowest average is WII with 56% and the highest is PS3 with 68%. XBOX360 averages 62.4%
of its observations being due to games developed and published by the same firm.
Finally, we put together Table 2B hoping to show a better connection between our non-exclusive
vertical integration variables and our firm level integration variables. Let us use a few examples to
illustrate how these variables work. Imagine first the case of a video game developed and published
by Nintendo and played in GameCube will observe a 1 for all dummy variables,even variables
Integrated Developer? and Integrated Publisher? Imagine now a video game developed by an
independent, published by Electronic Arts and played in GameCube. This game will have values
such that Integrated Developer? = 0 and Integrated Publisher? = 1. On the other hand, this
game will have value equal to zero for all integrated variables in this table. Lastly, imagine the case
of a game developed by an independent, published by Nintendo and played in WII. This game will
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have values such that Integrated Developer? = 0 and Integrated Publisher? = 1. The diﬀerence
here is that, even though the game developer-publisher integration and the three-way integration
variable will take value 0, the game publisher-platform integration variable will take value 1.
We show our statistics both by number of observations and number of games. Let us focus
on the bottom part of the table where we compile the number of observations at the game level
and therefore each cell contains the corresponding number of games. Out of a total of 3,385
games, 1,855 games are developed by integrated developers. Out of these 1,855 games, 233 are not
published by their publishing division. Only 163 are published by a firm owned by a platform and
only 117 are developed and published by the same platform owner. On the other hand, 2,996 out
of 3,385 games are published by integrated publishers. Of these, 1,474 games are developed by
an independent developer (independent to the integrated publisher in particular). Similarly, 276
games are published by the owner of their platform and of these 117 (consistently with the other
piece of data) are developed and published by the console owner.
4 Empirical Strategy and Results
We divide our regressions in two diﬀerent groups. The first group pins down cross-sectional
diﬀerences in our three performance measures (revenue, quantity and prices) between integrated
and non-integrated games. The second group of regressions will build up some structure into the
initial analysis and will estimate demand functions where market shares are being estimated as a
function of price, number of months since release and the organizational form involved in the game
production and distribution.
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4.1 Presenting Stylized Facts: Diﬀerences in Performance
As announced above, we have three measures of game performance through which we want to
establish stylized facts in this industry. These are logarithm of monthly revenues, monthly unit
sales and monthly average price. We therefore start our analysis by running separate regressions
for each one of the three performance measures.
We then run the following regression
ln(yipmy) = α0 + α1V ertIntDPipmy + α2V ertIntPPipmy + α3V ertIntDPP+
+ α4EXCLUipmy + α5AGEipmy + βXipmy + ipmy,
where ln(yipmy) represents our three performance measures; V ertIntDPipmy takes value 1 if game
i is produced and published by the same firm but the publisher is not integrated with platform
p, and 0 otherwise; V ertIntPPipmy takes value 1 if game i is published by the same firm that
owns platform p but developed by another firm, and 0 otherwise; and finally V ertIntDPPipmy
takes value 1 if game i is produced and published by the same firm that owns platform p, and 0
otherwise. These three dummy variables are exclusive among each other. Other regressors in this
descriptive analysis are EXCLUipmy which takes value 1 if game i is exclusive to platform p and
AGEipmy which measures the number of months since game i was released. The final regressor
Xipmy involves information regarding video game genre, platform and month-year fixed eﬀects. We
show results in Tables 3 to 5.
Table 3 oﬀers results of diﬀerences in revenues. We start our empirical analysis by observing
rough empirical correlations between weekly revenues and vertical integration and exclusivity vari-
ables. These correlations show that integrated games collect more revenues than independently
developed and published games. Column (2) adds video game age (number of months since release)
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which turns to explain quite a lot of the variation in the dependent variable since we observe R-
square go from 2% to 60%. Non-surprisingly, the older a game is the lower the revenues it collects.
In the following three columns we include Genre, Month and Platform fixed eﬀects to capture any
component specific to these categories that may be driving the observed diﬀerences in revenues.
The results are robust to the inclusion of these fixed eﬀects. Summarizing, we find that video
game vertical integration is positively correlated with higher levels of revenues. Additionally, we
also find that video game exclusivity is negatively correlated with weekly revenues.
In Table 4, we undertake the same analysis as in the previous table but this time we use the
number of units sold by month and video game as dependent variable. Similarly to Table 3, we
find that vertically integrated games sell more units than independently developed and published
games, even after controlling for video game age, and video game genre, month and platform fixed
eﬀects. We also find that video game exclusivity is negatively correlated with unit sales once we
take into account whether a game is developed and published under the same structure.
Finally, Table 5 oﬀers results of pursuing the same type of analysis with average monthly
prices (revenues divided by units sold) as dependent variable. Once again we find that vertically
integrated games perform better, in this case, sell at higher prices than independently developed
and published games. Contrary to findings above, exclusivity is positively correlated with higher
prices.
These results show that there are diﬀerences in performance across games developed and pub-
lished under diﬀerent organizational forms. In particular, we found that vertically integrated
games produce higher revenues, sell more units and sell at higher prices than independently devel-
oped and published games. In addition to this, and not central to our paper (but important to
other papers in the literature), we found that games independently developed and published games
that are exclusive to a platform produce less revenues, sell less units and sell at higher prices than
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non-exclusive independent games. In the next section, we will uncover how much of these cross-
sectional diﬀerences are due to diﬀerences in pricing and how much due to diﬀerences in consumer
demand correlated with quality (perceived or real) and organizational form.
4.2 Demand Estimation Methodology and Results
Once established above that vertically integrated games perform better, we now turn to demand
estimation to first check that the results above survive the introduction of structure in the esti-
mation. Here we follow the spirit of Lee (2009) in that we minimize substitution across games
and focus on substitution across platforms when specifying video game demand. For this reason,
we start by modeling video game demand as a binary discrete choice problem, that is, consumer
i either buys game j or she does not. This decision is assumed to be separate from buying other
games. Let us assume then that the utility that consumer i obtains from buying (and playing)
video game j in period t is
Uijt = Xjβ + α ln(pjt) + ξj + γ(t− tj) + ϕt + ijt
where ijt is an error term identically and independently distributed distributed across consumers
with the extreme value distribution function exp(−exp(−). I can call the mean utility of video
game j in period t δjt such that
δjt = Xjtβ + α ln(pjt) + ξj + γ(t− tj) + ϕt
where Xjt are observed game characteristics (that may change across time), ln(pjt) is the log of
video game price, ξj are unobservable quality characteristics, γ(t − tj) is capturing a trend that
makes outside option more attractive as time passes by from the release of video game j tj , and ϕ0t is
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an unobserved time-variant utility component common to all consumer. Given this decomposition
of the average utility of a video game per period, we then can rewrite the utility function above as
Uijt = δjt + ijt.
On the other hand, the alternative option to buying video game j is not to buy video game j.
The utility of this option can be characterized as follows
Ui0t = i0t,
where i0t is an error term also distributed with the extreme value distribution. The well-know
logit formula provides solution for the market share of game j in period t. In this case, this market
share is just the share of the population at risk that buys the video game as opposed to not buying
it. The solution specifies that
sjt =
exp(δjt)
1 + exp(δjt)
and
s0t =
1
1 + exp(δjt)
.
Then we can apply logs and substract each other to obtain
ln(sjt) = δjt = Xjtβ + α ln(pjt) + ξj + γ(t− tj) + ϕt
which we can estimate with our data even if we cannot observe a few variables (ξj and ϕt), as well
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as imperfectly measure others (Xjt and ln(pjt)). At this point, the inclusion of fixed eﬀects will be
of great service to control for these unobservables that may influence pricing and therefore create
a bias in the estimation of the coeﬃcient α. In this paper, we are not mainly interested in the
estimation of α but rather the possible correlation of vertical integration with a few characteristics
poorly measured by Xjt and ξj . This will help us understand the value and source of the impact
of vertical integration on video game demand.
For this purpose, we run the following regression equation
ln(sipmy) = α0 + α1 ln(avg_pipmy) + γ1Xipmy + γ2V I(V IDP, V IPP, V IDPP,EXCL)+
+
85X
j=1
α2j +
85X
z=1
α3z +
85X
j=1
3X
p=1
α4jp + ipmy.
In this specification, the dependent variable follows the analysis in Lee (2009) in that sipmy =
qipmy
Qpmy−Qipmy where qipmy is the number of units sold by game i of platform p in month m of year y,
Qpmy is the total number of platforms p sold up to monthm of year y and Qipmy is the total number
of units sold of game i for platform p before month m of year y. Therefore the dependent variable
is the share of consumers at risk of buying game i for platform p that actually buy the game in
month m of year y. The right-hand side of this regression equation does not diﬀer much than a
typical demand equation. Since we do not observe individual transactions but rather aggregate
revenues and unit sales per game, platform and month-year, we use average price per video game
and platform per month as our price variable such that ln(avg_pipmy).
Then we add observable game characteristics in Xipmy such as genre fixed eﬀects to con-
trol for vertical diﬀerences across games and finally we add our main variables of interest: the
game-specific vertical relation controls. These supply variables are DevIntipmy, PubIntipmy,
V IDPipmy, V IPPipmy, V IDPPipmy and EXCLipmy. Let us now define each one of these vari-
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ables: DevIntipmy takes value 1 if the developer of game i is integrated and 0 otherwise; PubIntipmy
takes value 1 if the publisher of game i is integrated into development and 0 otherwise; V IDPipmy
takes value 1 if game i is distributed by a publisher integrated with its developer and 0 otherwise;
V IPPipmy takes value 1 if game i is distributed by a publisher integrated with its platform but
not with its developer and 0 otherwise, V IDPPipmy takes value 1 if game i is distributed by a
publisher integrated with its platform and its developer; and finally EXCLipmy takes value 1 if
game i is exclusive to platform p. Since we are after the estimation of γ2, theoretically we do
not care if price is endogenous as long as it does not aﬀect the coeﬃcients on the vertical control
variables.4 We understand that game pricing is not exogenously determined and will be correlated
with a number of dimensions of the unobserved heterogeneity aﬀecting the problem of publishers.
For this reason, in our specifications below we start using game and month/year fixed eﬀects and
unbundle little by little this unobserved heterogeneity allowing us to observe how organizational
form may be correlated with vertical diﬀerentiation across games that ultimately drives demand
up or down.
Aside from this, we control for game age (months since release) using dummy variables α2j
and month-year fixed eﬀects α3z. Finally, we introduce month-year-platform fixed eﬀects α4jp
to control for platform specific intertemporal substitution. Our specifications may also use other
fixed eﬀects at the platform or month level, but the set of fixed eﬀects presented above will capture
the unobservable seasonality and platform specific heterogeneity that the rest of controls cannot
account for. We proceed next in Table 6 to show the results of estimating this demand equation.
Table 6 shows results of the empirical strategy above. See that columns (1) and (2) recover
the coeﬃcient on ln(avg_pipmy). This may be interpreted as constant price elasticity. In column
4Despite this, we instrument ln(avg_pipmy) using two instruments. The first instrument follows Lee (2009) with
lagged prices of a video game in a given platform. The second instrument that we use is the average price per game
in that platform in that period for all games released in the same month as game i. We do not show those results
here in this paper. We comment on this later in the paper when we display our results.
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(1) we use game-platform fixed eﬀects to control for all the unobserved heterogeneity hidden in the
error term and correlated with pricing decisions. In column (2) we use game and platform fixed
eﬀects separately for the same reason. Both regressions yield similar estimates of −0.6. These two
specifications also include age fixed eﬀects and month-year fixed eﬀects.
In column (3) we add to the specification our set of vertical relation variables (vertical inte-
gration and exclusivity) with the same set of fixed eﬀects as in column (2). According to this
specification and holding game and platform constant, it seems that vertical integration is only
positively correlated with demand when this takes place between publisher and platform or be-
tween developer, publisher and platform. This would say that games published and developed by
its platform perform better than those same games released for play in other platforms. Exclusivity
is negatively correlated with demand.
In columns (4) and (5), we substitute game fixed eﬀects by platform and genre fixed eﬀects and
platform/month/year and genre fixed eﬀects respectively. Opening the game fixed eﬀects allows us
to know more about how video game organizational form is correlated with the determinants of its
demand. We should note though that the price coeﬃcient is reduced significantly to −0.15 and
therefore we are leaving much unobservable heterogeneity loose that our vertical control variables
are not accounting for and yet may drive demand. These two specifications yield similar results.
Games developed by integrated developers and games published by integrated developers do better
than independent games regardless of whether their developer and publisher are integrated with
each other. If, on top of this, the publisher and developer of the game are integrated with each
other, or the publisher is integrated by the game’s platform, the game does better than otherwise.
Finally, when the game is developed and published by the game’s platform, the game does worse
than otherwise. Similarly to results in specification (3) we also find that non-exclusive independent
games perform better than exclusive independent games.
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Once we have established that there exist diﬀerences in demand for games produced and mar-
keted under organizational forms, we start wondering where these diﬀerences come from. One
may be concerned with whether the vertical control variables specified above are correlated with
unobserved variables that drive sales at the game-platform-month level (which is our observational
unit). The existing literature oﬀers several examples that document this may be a source of con-
cern. Nair (2007) shows that ex-post release promotional activities and marketing strategies in
the video game industry may increase demand. Ohashi (2005) shows evidence that publishers re-
lease their internally developed games further apart in time than they do with their independently
developed games. Finally, it may be that integrated games are diﬀerent in that their design and
development adjusts better to market trends and platform capabilities. We explore the importance
of these diﬀerent factors for video game performance in the next section.
5 Exploring the Causal Eﬀect of VI
Once we have established in the previous section that there is an empirical relation between vertical
integration and video game performance, we proceed to consider what are the causes of such
empirical correlation. In summary, there are three stages in the life of a game through which
vertical integration could play an important role. These are the developing stage, the publishing
and release stage and finally the post-release stage. This eﬀect could come from the fact that
publishing companies do a better job at promoting their own games after release, do a better job
at choosing the optimal time of release (by softening competition) or do a better job at producing
better games in terms of design and matching with demand trends and platform capabilities. We
next explore the role of these three potential explanations by directly investigating the role of the
former two and interpreting the residual eﬀect as supporting evidence for the latter.
One possible way in which publishers may aﬀect performance of their internally developed games
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relative to the games that they distribute and are developed by independent games is by providing
better marketing strategies and promotional activities after the game is released. By better, we
mean an array of potentially more eﬀective strategies such as better targeted marketing campaigns
or simply more advertisement.
To explore the relevance of this potential explanation, we run exactly the same specification as
we did in the previous section, but this time around, we introduce developer, publisher and game-
platform fixed eﬀects. By doing this, we are able to identify changes in demand (and performance)
due to changes in the game’s organizational form during its run and after its release. We devoted
great eﬀorts to include all acquisitions and mergers during the span of time that our data covers as
well as the month and year where these events took place. Therefore we are confident that after
including game fixed eﬀects and developer and publisher fixed eﬀects the changes in performance
are due to changes in marketing strategies that occur after a change in organizational form after
the release of the game and during its run.
We show the results of exploring this explanation in the first four columns of Table 7. In
columns (1) and (3) we introduce developer and publisher fixed eﬀects to the specification shown
on Table 6. The former does not contain month-year fixed eﬀects while the latter does. Since
the results are quite similar, let us focus on the results in column (3). According to our results,
changes in developer or publisher integration status without a change in game integration status
are associated with a negative change in demand. However, when a game itself during its run
becomes developer-publisher integrated or publisher-platform integrated its demand experiences a
jump upward. When a game goes from being independent to three-way integrated (developer,
publisher and platform), this change is associated with a decline in demand. See that here we
are holding the identity of game developer and publisher constant and therefore we are identifying
these correlations out of the game pool of each particular developer and publisher.
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The specifications in columns (2) and (4) oﬀer probably better answers to the question of
whether vertical integration boosts game demand due to better marketing strategies. Let us
focus on column (4) since demand seasonality is controlled for in that specification. Let us also
remember that this specification contains game-platform fixed eﬀects such that all “unobserved”
game characteristics are taken into account when exploring diﬀerences in performance between
independent and integrated games. We see according to these results that becoming an integrated
developer is associated with a loss in demand and becoming an integrated publisher is associated
with an increase in demand. The former result already appeared in column (3) but the latter
reverses the result in the previous column. This is consistent (although not a direct test) with
implications from Grossman and Hart (1986) in that, immediately after integration, the acquired
firm will suﬀer a decline in performance while the acquiring firm will increase its performance.
Additionally, we now observe that a game’s demand increases by 17 percentage points once
the game becomes developer-publisher integrated. This is evidence that one of the integration
benefits in this industry comes from better marketing strategies even after the release period. On
the other hand, we do not observe any diﬀerence in demand due to three-way integration and no
game experienced a change in publisher-platform integration status since no publisher belonging to
a platform merged with or acquired other publishers during the period of study.
Another potential explanation for the impact of vertical integration on video game performance
is that publishers coordinate better the release of their own games than the release of video game
developed by others. Ohashi (2005) empirically examines how release strategies diﬀer for games
distributed by publishers whether these own their developers. He finds that integrated games are
released further apart in time than non-integrated games. In other words, publishers soften com-
petition for their internally developed games more than they do for their independently developed
games and therefore increase sales for vertically integrated games.
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We explore this possibility by adapting our demand estimation methodology. Note that our
initial empirical strategy implicitly follows Lee (2009) and assumes that there is no substitution
across games while focusing on the intertemporal substitution across platforms as the main deterrent
of current game purchases. Evidence in Ohashi (2005) and Derdenger (2008) suggests otherwise
and substitution across games must be considered when studying video game demand. For our
purposes, vertical integration may play an important role if integrated publishers do better at
softening competition for their own games than non-integrated publishers are.
To examine the importance of this potential explanation, we follow in spirit the empirical
methodology of Ohashi (2005). In his paper, he measures the amount of competition that each
game faces within its genre and across genres and empirically relates that to whether the game’s
publisher is integrated with its platform. Here, instead of creating competition variables that
would account for softer competition of vertically integrated games, we introduce fixed eﬀects that
will implicitly do the same function with the advantage that using fixed eﬀects allows us to add
nonlinearities that otherwise would be ignored if we just included a linear regressor. In particular,
in column (5) of Table 7, we introduce platform-month-year-genre fixed eﬀects and in column (6)
of Table 7 we introduce platform-month-year-genre-age fixed eﬀects. We can use this vast number
of fixed eﬀects because of the richness of our dataset. Importantly this allows us to control for
diﬀerences in game competition within genre released in any given month. Any eﬀect of vertical
integration found in these specifications may be due to correlations of vertical diﬀerences between
games and diﬀerences in organizational form across games.
The results in the last two columns of Table 7 show the eﬀect of vertical integration after
controlling for changes in competition. In order to make sense of these results we need to compare
these to those in column (5) of Table 6 and those in column (4) of Table 7. In column (5) of
Table 6 the coeﬃcient on GameIntDev − Pub is +0.32. This same coeﬃcient in column (4) of
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Table 7 is +0.17. This means that there are 14 percentage points that are left unexplained and
that could be due to better quality games or less competition faced by vertically integrated games.
Unfortunately columns (5) and (6) in Table 7 yield very diﬀerent results in this regard. The former
column displays a coeﬃcient of +0.35 and the latter a coeﬃcient of +0.13. The former coeﬃcient
would say that there is 17 percentage points left unexplained and therefore due to better games
being produced by integrated developer-publishers. This result would imply that better release
strategies would have no explanatory value. The latter result would basically imply that better
release strategies explain those 17 extra percentage points in performance and that the quality of
integrated games is the same as that of independently developed and published games. Despite
this, results in columns (5) and (6) of Table 7 shows that games of integrated developers and
integrated publishers outperform games of independent developers and publishers by 40 percentage
points.
The eﬀect of publisher and platform integration is diﬃcult to disentangle with our empirical
methodology. The results in column (5) of Table 6 indicates that these type of integration is
associated with an increase of +1.46 log points extra in demand. We cannot determine what
percentage of this correlation is due to better marketing strategies since there is no variation in
our data at the game level. Instead, we do observe that in column (6) of Table 7 the coeﬃcient
jumps up to +1.75 log points. According to our analysis, this implies that accounting for softer
competition at release does not diminish the eﬀect. If anything, it diminishes demand by 25
percentage points implying that this eﬀect is not important for release of games published by the
platform themselves. This leaves the joint eﬀect of higher quality and better marketing strategies
(post-release) at a positive +1.75. Since this type of integration does not include the developing
stage, it may be safe to attribute the entire magnitude of this coeﬃcient to better marketing
strategies.
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When it comes to exploring the eﬀect of three-way integration with a platform, we observe that
the results go from a non-statistically significant -0.15 coeﬃcient on the three-way interaction in
column (4) of Table 7 to a statistically significant -0.87 in column (6). In column (5) of Table 6
this coeﬃcient takes value -0.24 and statistically significant. This would mean that games that
are three-way integrated have on average 87 percentage points less of demand and that the ability
of coordinating better their release and softening initial competition boosts up their demand by
nearly 60 percentage points.
The evidence from Table 7 shows that both ex-post promotional activities and release month
decisions are plausible explanations for the total impact of vertical integration on video game
performance. The question now is whether vertical integration has any eﬀect in the developing
stage and prior to release stage that translates into better performance along the life cycle of
the game. We address this concern above when we talk about the residual impact of vertical
integration on the quality of the games. See in Table 8 a summary of the impact of all three causal
explanations of vertical integration on video game demand. If anything, we find that on average
games internally produced are of lower quality than those produced by independent developers.
These results are, at least to us, surprising and open the question of why publishers and plat-
forms integrate at all into development, and more so, why these acquire developers that otherwise
they could be producing “better games” at arm length’s transactions. A possible reason why we
observe this eﬀect at the development and prior to release stage is that developers and publishers
incur lower adaptation costs once they become integrated. Another possibility could be that they
achieve better coordination at the same cost or even that integrated publisher represent the result
of a better (endogenous) match between publishers and developers within the same company than
the match of independent firms working together. Finally, another potential explanation is that
network eﬀects matter and that integrated publishers and platforms really care about the number
22
of games they release every year since that will determine their bargaining position with platforms
and will determine the platform demand itself.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we empirically examine the relation between vertical integration and video game
performance in the U.S. We do this in two significant ways. First we provide stylized facts
regarding performance diﬀerences across games with diﬀerent organizational forms. Second, we
estimate video game demand and relate diﬀerences in video game demand due to diﬀerences in
video game organizational form. Once we do this, we attempt to evaluate the causes of the impact
of vertical integration on video game demand by diﬀerentiating three possible sources: better
marketing strategies post video game release, better timing of video game release strategies and/or
inherently higher quality of video games.
Our results indicate that the superior performance of integrated games is mainly due to softer
competition at release and better post-release marketing strategies. In particular, we find post-
release marketing strategies to boost video game demand by a maximum of 17 percentage points
and softer competition at release to increase demand between 18 and 60 percentage points. Sur-
prisingly, our results suggest that video games developed and published by the same firm are not
better than those independently developed and published. If anything, these integrated video
games are inherently worse than independent games, ceteris paribus. Related to the literature on
platform demand and exclusivity, we also found that video game exclusivity is negatively correlated
with video game demand once we account for the existing vertical relations between developers,
publishers and platforms.
These results are surprising at least to us and may have direct implications not only for un-
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derstanding vertical integration but also for research on innovation management in innovative
industries. Had network eﬀects been absent, these findings seem to indicate that this industry
would be less integrated and more atomized than it is currently. This is consistent with observed
trends in other innovative industries where outsourcing innovation seems to be the way to conduct
research and other uncertain process that may drive costs up too high.
Despite the eﬀorts in the current article, we left many windows opened hoping in part to stir
discussion and in part to close them ourselves in future research. For instance, we did not address
the endogeneity of the vertical integration variable nor why we observe merger, acquisitions and
takeovers in this industry during the 7 years that our data spans. In the future, we will examine
this research question while relying in results in the current research to shed light more generally
on what drives organizational form in innovative industries. The object of this future research
should be of interest not only to those interested in the video game industry but also those readers
interested in the management of innovation and the economics of contract.
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Table 1. Summary Statistics for Performance Outcomes and Vertical Integration Variables
All obs. If VertInt Dev-Pub If VertInt Pub-Platf If VertInt Dev-Pub-Platf
Monthly Revenues 220172.3 274473.4 350968.8 609629.9
(1449824) (1651469) (1597786) (3604588)
Average Monthly Price 22.9 25.6 22.9 24.3
(12.0) (12.6) (14.1) (13.6)
Monthly Units Sold 5946.3 7217.0 9071.9 14926.1
(29587.0) (34419.9) (31843.6) (67409.6)
Age 25.0 25.0 26.5 26.0
(18.1) (18.3) (18.6) (18.8)
Vertical Integration Variables
VertInt Dev-Pub? 44.03% 100% - -
VertInt Pub-Platf? 4.67% - 100% -
VertInt Dev-Pub-Platf? 3.41% - - 100%
Integrated Developer? 53.31% 100% 17.13% 100%
Integrated Publisher? 88.43% 92.40% 100% 100%
Game Int Dev-Pub? 47.40% 100% 0% 100%
Game Int Pub-Platf? 8.30% 0% 100% 100%
Game Int Dev-Pub-Platf? 3.41% 0% 0% 100%
Note: This table provides summary statistics for three performance outcome variables, revenues, price and units sold. It also provides 
statistics for vertical integration variables used in our empirical methodology. Note that the first three variables are exclusive of each 
other whereas the last three are inclusive. We use the former three to establish cross-sectional differences among games and the 
latter three for our more detailed analysis that will shed light on how vertical integration impacts game performance.
Table 2A. Summary Statistics by Platform
PS2 XBOX GC XBOX360 WII PS3
Number of Games 1,509 884 546 196 131 79
VertInt Dev-Pub? 43.60% 41.80% 46% 62.40% 56.10% 68%
VertInt Pub-Platf? 4.21% 5.70% 4.10% 4.90% 3.80% 8.30%
VertInt Dev-Pub-Platf? 3.50% 2.30% 4.30% 5.60% 6.40% 10.20%
Average Monthly Revenues $242,427 $146,064 $146,302 $1,279,729 $1,128,127 $966,132
Median Monthly Revenues $9,457 $8,026 $7,351 $246,662 $281,610 $382,909
Min Monthly Revenues $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $2,902
Max Monthly Revenues $100,879,300 $87,669,040 $40,956,360 $141,363,100 $25,502,900 $20,031,190
Number Obs. 63,692 37,543 24,915 2,073 734 459
    
Note: This table provides summary statistics of most important variables. This is useful to present key differences across platforms in terms of
number of games released, vertical integration patterns and average and median monthly revenues.
Table 2B. More Descriptive Statistics for Vertical Integration Variables
By Observation
No Yes No Yes No Yes
Integrated Developer? No 60,428 0 55,421 5,007 60,428 0
Yes 7,600 61,388 63,233 5,755 64,579 4,409
Integrated Publisher? No 10,624 4,342 14,966 0 14,966 0
Yes 57,404 57,046 103,688 10,762 110,041 4,409
By Game
No Yes No Yes No Yes
Integrated Developer? No 1,530 0 1,417 113 1,530 0
Yes 233 1,622 1,692 163 1,738 117
Integrated Publisher? No 289 100 389 0 389 0
Yes 1,474 1,522 2,720 276 2,879 117
Note: This table offers cross-tabulations of vertical integration variables by weekly observation (top of the table) and by video
game (bottom of the table). From these, one may be able to construct VertInt Dev-Pub, Pub-Platf and Dev-Pub-Platf.
Game Int Dev-Pub? Game Int Pub-Platf? Game Int Dev-Pub-Platf?
Game Int Dev-Pub? Game Int Pub-Platf? Game Int Dev-Pub-Platf?
Table 3. Empirical Relation Between Vertical Integration and Monthly Video Game Revenues
Dep Var: log(revenue)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VertInt Dev-Pub 0.4635 0.4701 0.5599 0.5326 0.5188
(0.0159)*** (0.0101)*** (0.0103)*** (0.0101)*** (0.0099)***
VertInt Pub-Platform 1.0963 1.2940 1.4490 1.4789 1.5317
(0.0378)*** (0.0247)*** (0.0228)*** (0.0224)*** (0.0222)***
VertInt Dev-Pub-Platform 1.4534 1.5971 1.7564 1.7780 1.8142
(0.0456)*** (0.0318)*** (0.0302)*** (0.0294)*** (0.0305)***
Exclusivity -0.1561 -0.0144 -0.0639 -0.2309 -0.3597
(0.0159)*** (0.0100) (0.0102)*** (0.0106)*** (0.0109)***
Age -0.1196 -0.1196 -0.1119 -0.1101
(0.0003)*** (0.0003)*** (0.0004)*** (0.0004)***
Constant 9.0762 11.8377 11.8115 12.2751 12.0154
(0.0132)*** (0.0109)*** (0.0109)*** (0.0231)*** (0.0249)***
Genre FE No No Yes Yes Yes
Month FE No No No Yes Yes
Platform FE No No No No Yes
Observations 124000 124000 124000 124000 124000
R-squared 0.02 0.6 0.63 0.65 0.66
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 4. Empirical Relation Between Vertical Integration and Monthly Video Game Sales
Dep Var: log(quantity)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VertInt Dev-Pub 0.3689 0.3741 0.4490 0.4336 0.4241
(0.0142)*** (0.0096)*** (0.0099)*** (0.0097)*** (0.0096)***
VertInt Pub-Platform 1.1079 1.2749 1.3941 1.4259 1.4716
(0.0324)*** (0.0220)*** (0.0215)*** (0.0211)*** (0.0211)***
VertInt Dev-Pub-Platform 1.3790 1.5009 1.6271 1.6553 1.6962
(0.0389)*** (0.0289)*** (0.0279)*** (0.0273)*** (0.0284)***
Exclusivity -0.2739 -0.1531 -0.1679 -0.2964 -0.4124
(0.0142)*** (0.0096)*** (0.0097)*** (0.0102)*** (0.0105)***
Age -0.1016 -0.1015 -0.0966 -0.0948
(0.0003)*** (0.0003)*** (0.0003)*** (0.0003)***
Constant 6.2442 8.5903 8.5536 9.0441 8.7699
(0.0119)*** (0.0102)*** (0.0101)*** (0.0222)*** (0.0240)***
Genre FE No No Yes Yes Yes
Month FE No No No Yes Yes
Platform FE No No No No Yes
Observations 123974 123974 123974 123974 123974
R-squared 0.02 0.55 0.58 0.6 0.61
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 5. Empirical Relation Between Vertical Integration and Average Monthly Video Game Price
Dep Var: log(average price)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VertInt Dev-Pub 0.0947 0.0957 0.1107 0.0987 0.0943
(0.0032)*** (0.0026)*** (0.0027)*** (0.0026)*** (0.0026)***
VertInt Pub-Platform -0.0098 0.0199 0.0550 0.0537 0.0609
(0.0089) (0.0074)*** (0.0060)*** (0.0059)*** (0.0057)***
VertInt Dev-Pub-Platform 0.0761 0.0977 0.1307 0.1243 0.1195
(0.0096)*** (0.0071)*** (0.0069)*** (0.0066)*** (0.0066)***
Exclusivity 0.1160 0.1372 0.1029 0.0637 0.0507
(0.0032)*** (0.0026)*** (0.0026)*** (0.0027)*** (0.0028)***
Age -0.0180 -0.0180 -0.0153 -0.0152
(0.0001)*** (0.0001)*** (0.0001)*** (0.0001)***
Constant 2.8312 3.2468 3.2571 3.2315 3.2465
(0.0026)*** (0.0029)*** (0.0029)*** (0.0064)*** (0.0068)***
Genre FE No No Yes Yes Yes
Month FE No No No Yes Yes
Platform FE No No No No Yes
Observations 123929 123929 123929 123929 123929
R-squared 0.02 0.34 0.38 0.43 0.44
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 6. Video Game Demand Estimation Accounting for Vertical Integration Characteristics
Dep Var: log(Share)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Log(Average Price) -0.6080 -0.5727 -0.5753 -0.1597 -0.1922
(0.0120)*** (0.0116)*** (0.0116)*** (0.0124)*** (0.0124)***
Integrated Developer -0.0160 0.1435 0.1374
(0.0182) (0.0169)*** (0.0166)***
Integrated Publisher -0.1305 0.4345 0.4426
(0.0183)*** (0.0149)*** (0.0149)***
Game Int Dev-Pub -0.1325 0.3235 0.3184
(0.0189)*** (0.0174)*** (0.0169)***
Game Int Pub-Platform 0.2515 1.4471 1.4681
(0.0206)*** (0.0224)*** (0.0221)***
Game Int Dev-Pub-Platform 0.2437 -0.2099 -0.2449
(0.0331)*** (0.0363)*** (0.0356)***
Exclusivity -0.0505 -0.4194 -0.4299
(0.0094)*** (0.0104)*** (0.0107)***
Constant -9.4299 -9.5335 -9.3579 -10.7794 -10.6032
(0.2453)*** (0.1487)*** (0.1485)*** (0.0750)*** (0.0808)***
Age FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Game-Platform FE Yes No No No No
Game FE No Yes Yes No No
Platform FE No Yes Yes Yes No
Genre FE No No No Yes Yes
Platform-Month FE No No No No Yes
Observations 123651 123651 123651 123651 123651
R-squared 0.9 0.85 0.85 0.66 0.67
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 7. The Impact of Vertical Integration on Video Game Demand: Development versus Release and Marketing
Dep Var: log(Share)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log(Average Price) -0.2092 -0.5740 -0.3558 -0.6117 -0.2033 -0.3411
(0.0127)*** (0.0120)*** (0.0122)*** (0.0120)*** (0.0132)*** (0.0269)***
Integrated Developer -0.6882 -0.1667 -0.4833 -0.1685 0.1394 0.4050
(0.0336)*** (0.0305)*** (0.0315)*** (0.0297)*** (0.0176)*** (0.0382)***
Integrated Publisher -1.0573 0.0366 -0.3424 0.2853 0.4260 0.3770
(0.0849)*** (0.0618) (0.0763)*** (0.0569)*** (0.0157)*** (0.0329)***
Game Int Dev-Pub 0.6942 0.1935 0.7604 0.1657 0.3552 0.1349
(0.0272)*** (0.0378)*** (0.0255)*** (0.0365)*** (0.0179)*** (0.0375)***
Game Int Pub-Platform 3.3313 2.2850 1.5201 1.7478
(0.2370)*** (0.2247)*** (0.0229)*** (0.0573)***
Game Int Dev-Pub-Platform -0.2600 0.0083 -0.2985 -0.1586 -0.3314 -0.8744
(0.0705)*** (0.1239) (0.0674)*** (0.1168) (0.0376)*** (0.0818)***
Exclusivity -0.0315 -0.0236 -0.0792 -0.1576 -0.4659 -0.5329
(0.0109)*** (0.0114)** (0.0116)*** (0.0131)*** (0.0113)*** (0.0254)***
Constant -11.7807 -12.0929 -7.0892 -9.5740 -10.9786 -8.3158
(0.2274)*** (0.1776)*** (0.2656)*** (0.2558)*** (0.3346)*** (0.0853)***
Developer FE Yes No Yes No No No
Publisher FE Yes No Yes No No No
Age FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Month-Year FE No No Yes Yes No No
Game-Platform FE No Yes No Yes No No
Platform-Month-Genre FE No No No No Yes No
Platform-Month-Genre-Age FE No No No No No Yes
Observations 122932 123651 122932 123651 123651 123651
R-squared 0.72 0.88 0.75 0.9 0.7 0.9
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 8. Exploring the Causal Effect of Vertical Integration on Video Game Demand
(1) (4) (5)
Joint Effect Net Quality 
Effect
Net Release 
Period Effect
Column (5) Table 6 (3)-(2) (1)-(3)
Game Int Dev-Pub 0.3184 -0.0308 0.1834
(0.0169)***
Game Int Pub-Platform 1.4681 0† -0.2797
(0.0221)***
Game Int Dev-Pub-Platform -0.2449 -0.7158 0.6295
(0.0356)***
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.   †Note that we cannot disentangle the joint 
effect of marketing strategies and quality effect. This joint effect is 1.74 and the individual effects can take negative values.
(0.0573)***
-0.8744
(0.0818)***
Column (6) Table 7
0.1349
(0.0375)***
1.7478
-0.1586
(0.1168)
(2) (3)
0†
Post‐Release Mktg 
Strategies Effect
Column (4) Table 7
0.1657
(0.0365)***
Mktg Strategies + 
Quality Effect
